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2.1  Introduction 
One of the most remarkable changes in international trade during the past 
two decades has been the emergence of nontariff barriers (NTBs) as the new 
form of  protectionism  (Bhagwati  1988; Page  1987).  Voluntary  export re- 
straints, orderly marketing arrangements, countervailing duty complaints, and 
antidumping actions are the most commonly used weapons of the new protec- 
tionism.  Of  specific  interest for this  paper  is the widespread  popularity  of 
antidumping actions. While it is generally agreed that countervailing duty and 
antidumping laws have a legitimate role in maintaining “free and fair” trade, 
there is growing fear that such laws have been used to unfairly impede trade 
and harass rival foreign suppliers. 
Bhagwati (1988) argues that the design and implementation of antidumping 
law have encouraged  its strategic use.  For instance,  the Commerce Depart- 
ment’s procedures for calculating dumping margins can lead to positive mar- 
gins even though the average sales price across countries is the same. Domes- 
tic industries are not penalized for filing “frivolous” cases, and therefore are 
more likely to file with the intent to harass their rivals. Most importantly, since 
many actions are settled (i.e., involve some type of price or quantity agree- 
ment), merely analyzing the incidence of antidumping duties greatly under- 
states the true trade distortion. Messerlin (1988, 1989) and Prusa (1988) have 
shown that on average withdrawn cases are at least as restrictive as cases that 
actually result in duties. This is an important result, implying that in practice 
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antidumping law is far more protective than is typically measured. As we will 
discuss further in section 2.2, there are many reasons why a petition could be 
withdrawn,  some of which do not have any implication on the firms’ pricing 
practices.  But many others imply that prices for the goods involved will in- 
crease. 
While economists are beginning to understand the implications of such pe- 
tition withdrawals (Prusa 1988; Staiger and Wolak 1988, 1991), there has not 
been a systematic analysis of  what determines whether a case will be with- 
drawn or whether the International Trade Commission (ITC) will make the 
final decision. The purpose of this paper is to perform such an analysis. Since 
many (but not all) of the petition withdrawals have involved the steel industry, 
the simple answer is that cases involving the steel industry are withdrawn but 
others proceed through to the ITC’s injury-determination process. Given that 
the  steel  industry  has  apparently  entered a period of  “managed” trade,  we 
might expect the settlement issue to fade away. However, a closer look at the 
data  suggests  there  are  certain  characteristics  that  seem  to  predict  quite 
strongly how a case will ultimately be resolved. Therefore, I believe it is bet- 
ter to think of the steel industry as a special case of a more general phenome- 
non.  The analysis also reveals that the way in which an industry  uses anti- 
dumping  law  (i.e.,  filing  patterns,  countries  involved,  etc.)  strongly 
influences  the  outcome. Since many  other  industries  also feature the same 
characteristics that apparently lead to settled outcomes, it is likely that we will 
continue to observe a large number of antidumping cases being withdrawn. 
In particular, an antidumping investigation is best thought of as a two-stage 
decision problem. At the first stage the industry (or the U.S. Trade Represent- 
ative) decides whether to settle the case. If  the case is settled, the ITC never 
has to make its final injury decision. However, if  the case is not settled, the 
ITC will make its final decision. One advantage of this model is that we can 
partially capture the dynamics of the first-stage decision problem. In particu- 
lar, if we find that the characteristics (e.g., high unemployment, low capacity 
utilization) which influence the ITC’s final decision also lead to settlements 
(suggesting the foreign industry  settles because it realizes it will inevitably 
lose its case), then  the welfare implications of  such settlements may not be 
particularly adverse. If on the other hand, we find that political pressure plays 
the major role in determining  whether a case is settled (independent of the 
injury criteria),  then the welfare implications of  such agreements are much 
more unfavorable. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the institutional back- 
ground of U.S. antidumping law and provides  a broad description of its use 
during the past decade. Section 2.3 discusses the political pressures and eco- 
nomic criteria that may affect how a case is resolved and examines the rela- 
tionship between political and economic variables and case outcomes. Section 
2.4 tests more formally these relationships, using a nested logit model to ana- 49  Selection of  Antidumping Cases 
lyze the decision problem.  Section 2.5  provides concluding comments and 
discussion. 
2.2  Antidumping Law: The Statute and Recent lkends 
The purpose of this brief summary of antidumping law is to highlight the 
relevant aspects for this study. For a more in depth presentation, Jackson and 
Vermulst (1989) provide an excellent and up-to-date discussion, especially for 
those concerned with legal issues. Note also that since the Trade Agreement 
Act of  1979 made significant changes to U.S.  antidumping law, this discus- 
sion will focus only on actions during the 1980s. 
Simply put, “dumping” describes the sale of products for export at a price 
less than the price for which those products are sold in the home market (the 
“normal” price). While such a simple definition is adequate for this paper, one 
should be aware that as applied, the concept of dumping is extremely compli- 
cated. For instance, there are adjustments if there are too few home market 
sales, adjustments if the country is a nonmarket economy, and adjustments if 
sales are made below cost. For many studies these various complications are 
important considerations, but for the approach taken in this paper it is conve- 
nient if we think of dumping in its simplest terms. 
Typically an industry, or some group representing an industry (e.g., a trade 
association or union), simultaneously files a petition with the Commerce De- 
partment’s International Trade Administration (ITA) and with the ITC. In or- 
der for duties to be levied against the foreign industry, the ITA must determine 
that goods have been  sold at less than fair value (LTFV) and the ITC must 
determine that the domestic industry has been or is threatened with material 
injury by reason of dumped imports. It is noteworthy that each petition is filed 
against a single country. However, if the domestic industry believes that sev- 
eral countries have sold at LTFV, it will simultaneously file a petition against 
each country. A multiple petition filing increases the likelihood of an affirma- 
tive injury decision because the ITC follows the “cumulation principle” when 
determining injury. The cumulation principle allows the ITC to consider the 
total volume of  allegedly dumped imports from all involved countries. For 
example, if the domestic industry files antidumping complaints against three 
countries, each of which has 5 percent of the U.S. market, the ITC will base 
its injury determination on the injurious effect of  a 15 percent market share, 
even if  the dumping margins differ by  large amounts. The more countries 
involved in the investigation, the greater is the volume of trade, and therefore 
the greater is the  likelihood of  an  affirmative injury determination.  Since 
1980, approximately 70 percent of antidumping petitions have been part of a 
multiple petition filing. 
Once the petition has been filed, the ITA and ITC each make a series of 
decisions. Within 45 days the ITC makes a preliminary injury decision. If this 50  Thomas J. Prusa 
decision is negative, the case is terminated. Review of ITC cases suggests that 
the material injury standard is lower at the preliminary stage than at the final 
decision, and therefore cases terminated at the preliminary injury stage do not 
appear to have merit (see Moore 1988 for statistical evidence).  The purpose 
of the preliminary determination is to filter out these “frivolous” petitions. If 
the  ITC’s preliminary  decision  is affirmative,  the ITA makes a preliminary 
LTFV decision within  160 days and then a final LTFV decision within 75 days 
of  its preliminary decision. A final LTFV determination is made regardless of 
the preliminary decision (i.e., the ITA’s preliminary decision does not termi- 
nate the investigation).  The chief purpose of the preliminary LTFV decision is 
to set a temporary bond rate that is in effect until the case is officially resolved. 
The bond grants the domestic industry  temporary  protection  for the course 
of the investigation. If the foreign industry is found to have dumped, it forfeits 
the bond. If the ITA’s final decision is affirmative, the ITC must make its final 
injury decision no longer than 75 days after the ITA’s  final determination. If 
the ITC’s final decision is affirmative, duties are collected for a period of  no 
less than two years.  If the ITC’s final decision is negative, the case is termi- 
nated and any bond paid during the course of the investigation is refunded. 
At any time during the investigation,  the party that filed the petition can 
withdraw its petition. There are several reasons why this may happen. First, a 
disadvantageous decision or a piece of unfortunate evidence might be revealed 
which  leads  the party to withdraw  its petition.  For instance, the ITA  may 
decide to calculate dumping margins using a different set of  adjustment pro- 
cedures than was proposed in the petition.  Rather than proceed with a hope- 
less petition, the petition  may be withdrawn. Second, the U.S. government 
may arrange a quantity or price agreement with the foreign governmentlindus- 
try that eliminates the injury. Once an agreement is achieved, the U.S. govern- 
ment pressures the domestic industry to withdraw its petition. The 1982 and 
1984 steel arrangements are examples of this type of  withdrawal. Third, the 
case can be suspended if the foreign industry agrees to eliminate LTFV sales to 
the U.S. market. The 1985 semiconductor agreement  is an example of  this 
type of withdrawal.  Fourth, the party may withdraw  its petition  on its own 
accord, without any clear reason why it is doing so. It is possible that such 
withdrawals are based on some type of private agreement between the foreign 
and domestic parties. Prusa (1988) argues that such agreements are provided 
antitrust immunity by the Noerr-Pennington  Doctrine. 
As this discussion indicates, there are a number of ways a settlement can be 
reached,  and one should  not  infer that  a withdrawal  is an indication of  an 
unsuccessful petition.  In fact, a review of  the cases confirms that at least 80- 
90  percent  of  withdrawn  cases involve  some type  of  agreement. Unfortu- 
nately, given the way the U.S. government reports antidumping outcomes, it 
is sometimes impossible to know with certainty whether or not a withdrawal 
involves a settlement. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we will treat 
all withdrawn cases as if they involved some type of  settlement agreement, 51  Selection of  Antidumping Cases 
and hence we use the terms interchangeably.  Further, the analysis in the fol- 
lowing  sectians only  depends  on the  assumption  that  petition  withdrawals 
maximize firm profits. 
A look at recent trends in antidumping actions reveals that a surprisingly 
large number of cases (25 percent) are withdrawn. Table 2.1 presents a sum- 
mary of antidumping actions by product description and year for the 1980-88 
period. The broadly defined metals and metal products (MMP) industry has 
clearly been the heaviest user of antidumping law during the 1980s, account- 
ing for nearly two-thirds of the 395 cases. Despite its heavy use of the law, the 
MMP industry has only had moderate success in (officially) winning its cases, 
obtaining duties in approximately one-third of its cases. However, this is a bit 
deceptive since the MMP industry has accounted for over 90 percent of  the 
withdrawn  cases, obtaining  some type of  relief  in  about  ninety  additional 
cases. All in all, no other industry has had as much success with antidumping 
law as the MMP industry. The chemicals industry is the second largest user of 
antidumping law, while the agricultural products industry is third. However, 
neither of these industries display the same propensity  for settlements as the 
MMP industry. 
Table 2.2 breaks down cases by year. It is somewhat surprising that during 
the entire time period only twenty-four cases were terminated by a negative 
LTFV determination. This is consistent with the belief that the rules governing 
the ITA’s calculation procedures are biased against foreign producers. In con- 
trast,  showing material injury has proven to be more difficult. The ITC has 
rejected  sixty-five cases at the preliminary stage, despite the fact that (i)  the 
foreign industry’s has extremely limited time for defense preparation and (ii) 
that the preliminary injury standard is less exacting than the final injury stan- 
dard. This suggests that many frivolous cases are indeed filed. The ITC has 
also terminated an additional fifty-six cases at the final injury determination. 
Although  there have  been  petition  withdrawals nearly  every year,  approxi- 
mately 60 percent occurred in either  1982 or 1984, the years of the steel ar- 
rangements. 
Table 2.3 provides a regional tabulation of  cases. All told, more than fifty 
countries have been charged with dumping, with seven countries accounting 
for nearly  50 percent of the cases.’ Japan has been  the country most often 
alleged to have dumped, although the EC (as a region) has been involved in 
far more cases. The incidence of duties levied is probably the most striking 
difference between Japan and the EC: more than 50 percent of  cases against 
Japanese firms have resulted in duties,  while the corresponding rate for EC 
firms is only 18 percent. However, when one adjusts for the number of cases 
withdrawn, the incidence of successful cases against the EC and Japan is not 
terribly different.  The fact that Japan is less inclined to settle antidumping 
1. Japan, West Germany, Taiwan, Italy, Canada, Brazil, and South Korea are the countries most 
often involved (in descending order). Table 2.1  Antidumping Case Summary, 1980-1988, by TSUSA Code 
TSUSA Code and 
Product Description 
No 
Dumping  No Injury  No Injury  LTFV  Withdrawal/  Petition 
Order  (Preliminary)  (Final)  Sales  Agreement  Dismissed  Total 
100  Animal and vegetable products 
200  Wood and paper, printed matter 
300  Textile fibers and textile products 
400  Chemicals 
500  Nonmetallic metals 
600  Metals and metal products 
601-629  Metals 
63W59  Metal products 
660479  Machinery 
680-689  Electric machinery 
690-699  Transportation equipment 





















































































No. of  cases  135  65  56  24  108  7  395 
Note:  See appendix for data sources. Excludes 16 cases that have not been resolved. 53  Selection of  Antidumping Cases 
Table 2.2  Antidumping Case Summary, 1980-1988,  by  Year  Initiated 
Dumping  No Injury  No Injury  No LTVF  Withdrawal/  Petition 
Year  Order  (Preliminary)  (Final)  Sales  Agreement  Dismissed  Total 
1978  1  0  0  0  0  0  1 
1979  4  0  3  1  0  0  8 
1980  4  13  1  1  10  0  29 
1981  5  2  I  1  4  2  15 
1982  13  18  5  3  23  3  65 
1983  19  7  10  5  3  2  46 
1984  8  2  10  6  44  0  70 
1985  27  12  7  2  15  0  63 
1986  44  8  9  3  7  0  71 
1987  8  2  3  0  2  0  15 
1988  2  1  7  2  0  0  12 
No. of  cases  135  65  56  24  108  7  395 
Note;  See appendix for data sources. Excludes  16 cases that have not been resolved. Nine of  the antid- 
umping cases initiated during 1978 and 1979 were not resolved until after the  1979 Trade Agreement Act 
took effect. 
cases in a politically agreeable fashion is somewhat surprising, given its pro- 
pensity  for managed trade agreements; in addition, the heightened publicity 
surrounding official ITC decisions probably  contributes to the feelings that 
Japan competes unfairly. 
2.3  Political Pressure vs. Economic Criteria 
The overview presented in the previous  section showed that antidumping 
law has been used by a wide variety of industries and against a large number 
of countries.  It also revealed that a striking number of  cases are withdrawn. 
Figure 2.1 depicts the hypothesized decision process.  At the first stage the 
domestic complainant and foreign respondent decide whether to settle. If the 
case is not  settled/withdrawn,  the ITC will proceed  with its determination. 
For simplicity we will assume that frivolous cases have been eliminated at the 
ITC’s preliminary determination and that the ITA has found dumping. Given 
the data presented in section 2.2, these are reasonable assumptions. 
What factors influence whether a case is withdrawn? This paper will ex- 
plore two hypotheses:  self-selection and political pressure. The self-selection 
hypothesis argues that cases are settled to avoid the inevitable ITC outcome. 
Specifically, if the domestic industry  files its antidumping petition (and the 
foreign industry defends itself) in order to increase profits, the petition will be 
withdrawn only if the profits from withdrawing are greater than the expected 
profits from an official ITC decision.  Letting  IIw (II:)  denote the domestic 
(foreign) industry’s profits from withdrawing, nD  (n;) denote the domestic 
(foreign) industry’s profits if the ITC levies duties, nN  (n;) denote the domes- 
tic (foreign) industry’s profits if the ITC rejects the petition, and C (C*)  denote 54  Thomas J. Prusa 
Table 2.3  Antidumping Case Summary, 1980-1988,  by Region 
Dumping  No Injury  No Injury  No LTFV  Withdrawal/  Petition 
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Nore: See table 2.1. 
the domestic (foreign) industry’s additional legal expenses if the case pro- 
ceeds through the injury decision, the petition will be withdrawn if 
(1)  n,  2  pnO  + (1 - p)n, - c, 
nt, 2 p*n;  + (1 - p*)n,; - c*, 
where p (p*) denotes the domestic (foreign) industry’s subjective probability 
of  an affirmative injury decision. Clearly, IID > II,  and II;  > II;.  That is, 
the domestic industry benefits and the foreign firm loses when duties are lev- 
ied. Further, we will assume n,  2 II,  2 IIN and  5 n>  5 HA.  That is, 
the payoff or value of a withdrawn case falls somewhere between the payoffs 
under the other two alternatives.* 
As the ITC’s investigation proceeds, both parties will estimate p (p*). The 
ITC typically cites changes in capacity utilization, employment, and import 
market share, etc., in its reports, and thus these variables will be used to esti- 
mate p (p*).  If  the economic criteria indicate injury, then the parties will at- 
tempt to reach some agreement (i.e.,  Q and p* close to 1). Under these circum- 
stances, withdrawn cases are self-selected based on their likely outcome. If 
self-selection  describes the withdrawal process, then settlements have roughly 
the same welfare consequences (for consumers) as duties. In particular, do- 
mestic consumers will pay higher prices for the foreign goods because there 
has been a violation of  fair trade principles. 
In contrast, under the political pressure hypothesis, cases are withdrawn not 
2.  Prusa (1988) has shown that this ranking of payoffs need not always hold. For the present 
analysis, however, it is convenient to assume that the domestic industry’s payoff from withdrawal 
is less than the payoff when duties are levied. 55  Selection of  Antidumping Cases 
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because the inevitability of the outcome but rather because it is in the political 
interest of the United States to arrange a negotiated settlement. An antidump- 
ing action might become a political issue if the filing involves multiple coun- 
tries. The threat of  duties being levied against a large number of  countries 
elevates the issue into a major international dispute. In 1984, for instance, in 
response to the wave of antidumping petitions filed against EC steel produc- 
ers, the EC threatened retaliation against paper, beef, and fertilizers (Howell 
et al.  1988). Obviously neither the United States nor the EC wanted a trade 
war,  so they negotiated a settlement. In other words, the way  in which an 
industry files its petitions can increase its chances for “negotiated” protection. 
Under this political pressure hypothesis, equation (1) need not be satisfied for 
a settlement agreement to be  achieved. For example,  suppose both parties 
know that it is very likely the case will be rejected if it proceeds through the 
ITC’s final decision (i.e., p = p* = 0). The domestic firm will agree to vir- 
tually any  settlement since II,  2  IIN - C;  however, the foreign firm will 
only commit to a price undertaking if  IIL 2  II;  - C*. If  C* is small, the 
foreign firm will not be willing to offer a price undertaking (since IIL 5  rI;) 
and thus it is not likely that case will be ~ettled.~ 
However, under the political pressure hypothesis, the foreign industry may 
be forced (by its own government) to offer a price undertaking even if it has 
not  injured the domestic industry. By  filing multiple petitions the domestic 
industry can force the U.S. and foreign governments to deal with a sectoral 
3. If p = 0, the domestic industry may prefer to withdraw its petition (without any undertak- 
ing) to avoid spending C. 56  Thomas J. Prusa 
problem in the broader context of  overall U.S. foreign relations; the mere 
investigation and threat of duties threatens trade relations and can lead to the 
imposition of a price/quota agreement even when it is unlikely that duties will 
be le~ied.~ 
The theory of “congressional dominance” provides another justification for 
the political pressure hypothesis (Weingast 198 1 ;  1984; Weingast and Moran 
1983). Under this theory Congress controls agency decisions via oversight 
committees and budget decisions. Members of Congress favor agencies who 
“serve their constituencies” and penalize those who do not. Baldwin (1985) 
argues that the structure of the ITC insulates the commissioners from undue 
congressional pre~sure;~  however, Moore ( 1988) argues that because Congress 
has complete control (no OMB oversight) over the ITC’s budget,  Baldwin 
underestimates Congress’s leverage. 
Using  different  methodology  and  data  sets,  Moore  (1988) and  Hansen 
(1990) have both found that oversight committees exert significant influence 
on ITC decisions. One advantage of  Moore’s approach is that he uses data 
reported in the official ITC reports. However, this also severely limits the type 
and quantity of data he can use, since only cases with ITC injury determina- 
tions enter his analysis. In addition, confidentiality prevents data from being 
published for those cases involving a small number of firms. Because much 
of the data he uses is unavailable for many cases, his data set coverage is much 
more limited than mine. Moreover, since the cases that do not enter Moore’s 
analysis all have a similar industry structure,  his results must be carefully 
interpreted. Hansen takes a different approach, estimating the ITC’s decision 
function for antidumping, countervailing duty, and escape clause cases for the 
1975-84 period. Her data set is much broader than mine, but since the injury 
criteria for an escape clause determination is quite different from antidumping 
and countervailing duty determinations, her injury estimation does not have a 
natural interpretation. Furthermore,  and most relevant for this analysis, nei- 
ther Hansen nor Moore consider the (firm’s) first-stage decision in their anal- 
ysis, and therefore they ignore a sizable number of cases. The chief advantage 
of  the approach taken in this paper is that by  also measuring the influence 
exerted at the withdrawal stage, it permits a more precise characterization of 
the (potential) political pressure. For instance, congressional oversight com- 
mittees could influence the likelihood of a settled case by  (i)  pressuring the 
U.S.  Trade Representative (USTR) to negotiate a settlement and/or (ii) by 
raising the likelihood of an affirmative decision via pressure of the ITC. Fur- 
ther, there are a couple reasons why Congress would prefer protection granted 
4. Howell et al. (1988) argue that steel quotas have been agreed to when it appeared that there 
would be a “no injury” finding. 
5. Commissioners cannot be reappointed, they are nominated by the executive branch but ap- 
proved by the legislative branch, and no more than three commissioners can be from the same 
Party. 57  Selection of Antidumping Cases 
via petition withdraws rather than via ITC decisions.  First,  if  members of 
Congress are risk averse, they would prefer the certainty of a settled outcome 
to the uncertain ITC outcome. Second, settled cases do not enter the official 
measures of protectionism. Thus, in the context of  trade negotiations, Con- 
gress may prefer protection granted via unofficial settlements since it provides 
a veil for trade restrictions. 
Before proceeding to the formal econometric test, one can gain quite a bit 
of insight into the data by simply examining simple cross-tabulation relation- 
ships among variables. For instance, to examine political pressure,  I parti- 
tioned the data set into those cases with and without production facilities in 
states (districts) which had a representative on the Senate International trade 
Subcommittee or House Trade Subcommittee (table 2.4),  the subcommittees 
that have direct oversight responsibilities for the ITC. Note that in this table 
(and all of the following) I focus only on those cases that were withdrawn or 
were subject to a final ITC decision. Also due to data limitations I was forced 
to drop eighteen cases, most of which involved agricultural products. A more 
detailed discussion of  the methods used to construct the data series used in 
this paper can be found in the appendix. 
If the null hypothesis is that these subcommittees influence decisions, then 
we  would expect industries with oversight representation to gain protection 
more often than those industries without representation. Looking first at the 
top panel (Senate), it is clear that congressional representation has a strong 
affect on the withdrawal decision. Of the  106 withdrawals, 104 were repre- 
sented by  at least two senators,  while 99 were represented by  at least five 
senators. Virtually the identical pattern is found when we look at the House 
oversight subcommittee.  Since withdrawals typically involve some type of 
protection, these numbers suggest that industries with strong oversight repre- 
sentation are more likely to be protected. However, in contrast with the Moore 
(1988) and Hansen (1990) studies, this table suggests the oversight commit- 
tees do not exert undue influence on the ITC’s injury decision. Overall, of the 
175 cases that proceeded to the ITC, 126 (72 percent) resulted in duties. When 
we  control for congressional representation, we find rather surprisingly that 
cases without congressional representation have a higher probability of  ob- 
taining protection than those with representation. Although the differences in 
conditional probabilities are not as dramatic as those for the first stage, they 
do suggest that if Congress does influence antidumping outcomes, the major 
effect is on the settlement process. 
The data in table 2.1 revealed that the majority of withdrawn cases involved 
metal products and thus it is natural to explore this relationship further. In 
table 2.5, I partition the cases by whether they involve steel products and find 
(as expected) most of the withdrawn cases (87 percent) involve steel; however, 
the second-stage decision appears to be independent of whether the steel in- 
dustry is involved. This is a bit surprising since a number of  steel analysts 58  Thomas J. Prusa 
Table 2.4  Congressional Oversight 
Petition Withdrawn' 
Agreement  Dumping Order  No Injury (Final)  Total 
Senate International Trade Subcommittee 
Senators with production facilities in their state: 
Cases with < 2 members  2  17 (81%)  4 (19%)  23 
Cases with 2 2 members  104  109 (71%)  45 (29%)  258 
Cases with <  5 members 
Cases with 2 5 members 
I 
99 
62 (77%)  19 (23%)  88 
64  (68%)  30 (32%)  193 
Overall  106  126 (72%)  49 (28%)  28 1 
House of  Representatives Trade Subcommittee 
Members of  Congress with production facilities in their state: 
Cases with < 2 members  5  27 (75%)  9 (25%)  41 
Cases with 2  2 members  101  99 (71%)  40 (29%)  240 
Cases with <  4 members  10  53 (67%)  26 (33%)  89 
Cases with 2 4 members  96  73 (76%)  23 (24%)  192 
Overall  106  126 (72%)  49 (28%)  28 1 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are conditional probabilities (i.e., probability of  affirmative [negative] ITC 
decision, given that case proceeds to final decision). See appendix for data sources. 
Table 2.5  Steel Industry Effect 
Petition Withdrawn/ 
Agreement  Dumping Order  No Injury (Final)  Total 
Cases not involving steel  14  59 (69%)  26 (31%)  99 
products 
products 
Cases involving steel  92  67 (74%)  23 (26%)  182 
Overall  106  126 (72%)  49 (28%)  28 1 
Note:  See table 2.4 
have argued quite strongly that foreign dumping has greatly injured the U.S. 
steel  industry.6  However,  if  cases  are  being  withdrawn  because  of  self- 
selection, we would expect this result. For instance, if it was known that the 
steel industry received  preferential  treatment from the  ITC, rational parties 
would take this into account when forming their expectations of p (p"). Since 
the withdrawal decision will adjust for the industry-specific preferential treat- 
ment at the ITC, the steel cases that proceed  to the ITC will have the same 
chance of obtaining protection as nonsteel cases, even though on their objec- 
tive merits,  steel cases could be weaker than nonsteel cases. Therefore,  the 
6. See Howell et al. (1988) for numerous references. 59  Selection of  Antidumping Cases 
Table 2.6  Number of Countries Involved in Filing 
Petition Withdrawn/ 
Agreement  Dumping Order  No Injury (Final)  Total 
Filings with  1 Country  15  51 (74%)  18 (26%)  84 
Filings with > I  Country  91  75 (71%)  31 (29%)  197 
Filings with 2 2 Countries  22  75 (74%)  26 (26%)  123 
Filings with > 2 Countries  84  51 (69%)  23(31%)  158 
Filings with 5 4 Countries  43  112 (76%)  35 (24%)  190 
Filings with > 4 Countries  63  14 (50%)  14 (50%)  91 
Overall  106  126 (72%)  49(28%)  281 
Note:  See table 2.4. 
independence of  the  second-stage decision  from  known  variables  (may) 
merely reflect that agents are acting optimally at the first stage.’ 
It was argued above that the practice of filing multiple petitions has become 
quite standard. Filing multiple petitions raises the international visibility of 
the dumping allegations, increasing the likelihood of a settlement. Table 2.6 
verifies this. Over 80 percent of  the withdrawn cases involved at least three 
countries. It is also argued that filing multiple petitions increases the probabil- 
ity of injury via the “cumulation principle.” However, the conditional proba- 
bility of  an  affirmative ITC decision does not appear to be  affected by  the 
number of countries involved. This suggests either that cumulation is not as 
“protective” as originally thought or that cumulation affects the outcome via 
the self-selection process. 
We  also expect that the economic criteria that the ITC uses to determine 
injury to influence both the first- and second-stage decisions. Tables 2.7 and 
2.8 present data on employment, capacity utilization, and concentration ra- 
tios; a review of ITC case reports suggests that these variables play an impor- 
tant role in ITC decisions. A dramatic fall in employment or capacity utiliza- 
tion  may  reflect  injury.s The concentration ratio serves as a proxy for the 
appropriability of  the benefits of  protection. Industries with high concentra- 
tion ratios will not suffer from the free-rider problem that might plague more 
competitive industries and thus might be able to more effectively lobby for 
protection. Note,  however, that other criteria such as import market share, 
exports, and inventory are also sometimes cited as important factors; unfor- 
tunately the unavailability of data prevented these variables from being used 
in this study. More will be said on this subject in section 2.5. 
7. Priest and Klein (1984) formally develop this selection argument for litigation cases. 
8. The ITC actually determines injury after controlling for changes due to cyclical changes in 
the overall economy. Therefore, one would actually like to examine the relationship between the 
changes in employment and capacity utilization after purging these variables of cyclical compo- 
nents.  If the time series existed as monthly data then one could regress capacity utilization on 
GNP  to remove the cyclical component. Because I only have annual data, I do not detrend the 
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Table 2.7  Economic Criteria-Distributions 
Petition 
Withdrawn/  No Injury 
Agreement  Dumping Order  (Final)  Overall 
Mean 
Capacity Utilization  (year lo)  59.5  66.7  66.4  64.5 
%A capacity utilization  16.0%  -  0.9%  5.8%  4.4% 
%A capacity utilization  -  11  .O%  2.0%  2.4%  -  2.9% 
(hetween year ro and r. 
(between year  and tJ 
Employment (thousands)  234.5  108.3  115.2  148.4 
%A employment (between  -8.1%  -5.6%  -4.0%  -  6.4% 
year t,, and  f  ~ 
year r-, and r-J 
%A employment (between  -7.1%  -  4.0%  -5.4%  -5.2% 
Final ITA Duty Margin  ...  28.98%  30.32%  ... 
Median 
Capacity Utilization  (year to)  59  66  66  66 
%A capacity utilization  -  10.6%  -  2.6%  0%  -5.6% 
(between year r,, and t- 
(between year I-,  and I-?) 
%A capacity utilization  0%  -3.6%  0%  -  3.6% 
Employment (thousands)  247.3  73.3  43.7  90.6 
%A employment (between  -  2.6%  -5.2%  -  2.6%  -4.3% 
year to  and t 
year t ~, and r  ~  I) 
%A employment (between  -3.3%  -3.1%  -  1.2%  -3.1% 
Final ITA Duty Margin  ...  14.71%  17.58%  ... 
Table 2.7 presents the mean  and median  of these criteria, conditional on 
outcome. A number of insights emerge from this table. First, withdrawn cases 
have the lowest capacity utilization; however, if the case proceeds to the ITC, 
capacity utilization does not appear to be an important predictor of  the final 
outcome. This pattern  is consistent with the self-selection hypothesis. With- 
drawn cases have also had the greatest fall in capacity utilization (during the 
year  prior  to  the  petition),  which  also  suggests that  cases  are being  self- 
selected on the basis of  injury criteria.Second,  withdrawn cases tend to be 
from  “large”  industries,  having  employment  about  twice  as great  as those 
cases  that proceed  to the  ITC.  This is consistent  with  the  adding-machine 
model of Caves (1976) and suggests that industries with many employees are 
more effective lobbyers.  However, employment does not appear to have any 
significant  affect on the ITC’s decision,  which is consistent with Baldwin’s 
conjecture that the ITC is insulated from lobbying pressure. It is also consist- 
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Table 2.8  Economic Criteria Influence 
Cases with 
Capacity utilization < 66 
Capacity utilization 2 66 
Employment < 137 
Employment 2 137 
Concentration < 42 
Concentration 2 42 
Overall 
Petition Withdrawn/  Dumping 
Agreement  Order 
33  84 (74%) 
73  42 (68%) 
18  91 (75%) 
88  35 (66%) 
17  79 (77%) 
89  47 (65%) 
106  126 (72%) 


















Nofe:  Numbers in parentheses are conditional probabilities (i.e., probability of  affirmative [neg- 
ative] ITC decision, given that case proceeds to final decision). See appendix for data sources. 
The partitioning cutoffs are the distribution medians. Employment is in thousands. 
via self-selection. Withdrawn cases also have had the greatest fall in employ- 
ment (during the year prior to the petition).  Finally, the results in Table 2.7 
suggest that the ITC ignores the dumping margin when determining  injury 
since average duties are higher for “no injury” decisions than for injury deci- 
sions. 
Table 2.8 partitions the data set into those cases that fall above and below 
the median  value of  capacity utilization, employment,  and concentration ra- 
tio. The capacity utilization results continue to be quite consistent with the 
self-selection hypothesis. The employment and concentration results suggest 
that large concentrated industries are more able to negotiate a withdrawal than 
small competitive industries.  However, as has been the case for all the other 
“predictors ,” none of these variables appear to be a significant predictor of the 
ITC’s final decision. 
2.4  Estimating the Decision Bee 
The  hypothesized  two-stage  decision  problem  lends  itself  naturally  to 
nested-logit analysis. In the first stage the industry (or USTR) makes a binary 
decision whether to settlelwithdraw (choice A,), taking into account the ex- 
pected  ITC  decision.  In  the  second  stage the  ITC  makes  a  binary  choice 
whether the domestic industry has been injured (choice A2) or not (choice AJ, 
conditional on the case not having been  withdrawn.  Since the econometric 
theory  is well established  my  presentation  of  the  model  will be brief.  Mc- 
Fadden (1978) and Hausman and McFadden (1984) are the seminal presenta- 
tions of  the theory; my  presentation  most  closely  follows that of  Maddala 
(1 983). 
At the first stage, we will assume that the ith case’s withdrawal decision is 
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(2)  y:  = X,P + Flr' 
where y:  is a latent continuous measure of the likelihood that the petition is 
withdrawn. However, we do not observe y: but rather an indicator function y, 
defined by 
(3) 
1, if y:  > 0, 
Y, = [  0, otherwise. 
Equations (2) and (3) imply that the probability of observing choice A,  can be 
written as 
(4) 
where F(.)  is the cumulative distribution function of p,,. 
is given by 
(5) 
where v:  is a latent continuous measure of the likelihood that duties are levied. 
Once again, we do not observe v:  but rather an indicator function  v,  defined 
Similarly, at the second stage, we will assume the ith case's  final decision 
v:  = z,r + P2,1 
by 
1, if  v:  > 0, 
'  0, otherwise.  v. = [ 
Equations (5)  and (6)  imply that the probability of observing choice A, can 
be written as 
P(v, =  1)  = P(v: > 0  1  Z,) 
(7)  = P(P2, > -Z,Y) 
= 1 - G(-Z,y), 
where G(  *)  is the cumulative distribution function of p2r. 
X is a vector of exogenous variables that determine the withdrawal decision 
while Z is a vector of exogenous variables that determine the final decision. 
The pI,  and p2,  are residuals that capture unmeasured variables, case idiosyn- 
crasies, etc. In this case, the observed values of y, and v,  are just realizations 
of  a binomial process given by equations (4) and (7), varying from case to 
case (i.e., depending on X, and Z,).  If we assume that p,, and p2,  are indepen- 
dently distributed we can write the likelihood function as 
L  = n  [l -  F(-X,P)]  n  F(-X,P)X 
Yt=  1  y,=O  (8) 
L";=  1  "i =  0 63  Selection of  Antidumping Cases 
The functional forms for F(.) and G(*)  in equation (8) will depend on the 
assumptions made about pIi  and  kZi  in  equations (2) and (3,  respectively. 
Assuming that kl,  and kz,  are i.i.d. with the generalized extreme-value distri- 
bution allows us to write the discrete choice probabilities as9 
Given these probabilities, the log likelihood can be written as 
(9) 
where D,"  = 1 if the nth case is resolved via outcome A, and zero otherwise. 
In many applications the choice of X and Z is restricted by economic theory. 
In  the current application model specification is more open-ended. For this 
paper we will use the economic and political pressure variables discussed in 
section 2.3. Further discussion of this issue is found in section 2.5. 
Given our model, the first-stage decision will be influenced by  the expec- 
tation of the second-stage decision and possibly more directly by other politi- 
cal and economic factors. To  distinguish whether a variable affects the with- 
drawal decision directly or indirectly via its affect on  the injury decision, I 
will first present a variety of  specifications of the withdrawal decision without 
altering the second-stage specification. Then, after the withdrawal decision 
has been adequately characterized, I will present a variety of specifications of 
the injury decision without altering the first-stage specification. Thus, in a 
sense the econometric analysis proceeds in two steps, since we  first analyze 
the determinants of the withdrawal decision and then analyze the determinants 
of the injury decision. It is important to stress that each model specification 
involves reestimating the entire decision tree (i.e., both stages). Table  2.9 
presents a variety of specifications that help clarify the decision process. The 
first set of  regressions (models 1-6)  concentrates on the first-stage decision, 
while the second set of regressions (models 7-1  1) focuses on the second-stage 
decision. 
The analysis of the first-stage withdrawal decision reveals that the level of 
employment and  the number of  countries involved in the filing are the key 
characteristics of  a case that predict whether a petition will be  withdrawn. 
N3 
LOGL(P, Y) =  0, log P(A, I Z, X;  P, Y), 
n=l ]=I 
9. In McFadden's (1978) original formulation of the nested-logit model, he estimates an inclu- 
sive value that weights the second-stage decision. In this application,  since the Z vector is chooser- 
specific, the inclusive value is not identified. In this case, the nested logit is equivalent to a con- 
ditional logit model. Table 2.9  Nested Logit Estimates 
Model  I  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
First stage: 
Constant 
Steel dummy (=  1  if steel) 
No. countries in Filing (=  I  if>2) 
Employment 
Senate oversight (=  1 if22) 
%A capacity util.  (to and 1- ,) 
%A capacity util.  (1-, and t 
%A employment (to and 1- ,) 
%A employment (t-,  and f-2) 
Second stage: 
Constant 
%A capacity util. (to  and t-  ,) 











-  1.458 
( -  1.679) 










-  1.763 
(- 1.952) 












-  1.726 
( -  1.857) 










-  1.578 













-  1.715 
(- 1.888) 






-  2.879 











-  1.587 
( -  1.634) %A employment (to  and t  ,)  -0.241 
( -  0.1  38) 
%A employment (t-,  and I-  ?)  4.366 
(2.2  19) 
Final ITA duty margin  0.019 
(4.093) 
Log likelihood  -243.257 
% correct predictions 
First stage  80.43% 
Second stage  72.57% 






-  224.034 
85.41% 
73.14% 
-  1.904 
( -  1.059) 
3.626 
(I  ,726) 
0.015 
(3.224) 






























Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10  Model  II 
First stage: 
Constant 
No. countries in filing (= 1 if >2) 
Employment 
%A capacity util. (to  and t-,) 
Second stage: 
Constant 
%A capacity util. (to  and t_ 
%A capacity util. (f-l and 1-J 












-  1.740 
(- 1.920) 











( -  0.260) 
-  1.637 
(- 1.760) 
-  1.740 





-  3.059 
( -  2.464) 
0.558 
(1.916) 










-  3.008 





-  1.699 
(- 1.863) 
-  1.683 
( -  4.122) 
1.282 
(3.67  1) 
0.009 
(4.660) 






-  1.831 
(- 1.957) 
(continued) Table 2.9  Nested Logit Estimates (continued) 
Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10  Model 11 
%A employment (r,) and t_ 
%A employment (t~,  and 1-J 
Final ITA duty margin 
No. countries in filing (=  I  if >2) 
Steel dummy (=  1 if steel) 





% correct predictions 
First stage 
Second stage 






-  220.256 
82.21% 
73.71% 
-  2.462 


























-  0.294 
(- 0.557) 
-  220.095 
82.21% 
74.29% 








-0.01  1 






Note: t-statistics in parentheses. First-stage estimates Pr(Withdrawa1); second-stage estimates Pr(Duties 1  No Withdrawal) 67  Selection of  Antidumping Cases 
When regressed without employment, the steel industry dummy and senate 
oversight dummy are positive and significant (see model  1 and model 4, re- 
spectively).  lo  A positive coefficient implies that the steel industry and senate 
oversight dummies increase the likelihood of a withdrawal.  However, when 
employment  is  added  to the  specification both  variables  lose  their  signifi- 
cance, being dominated by the employment effect (models 3 and 5,  respec- 
tively), Moreover,  when employment is regressed without either the steel or 
oversight dummies, the results are virtually the same as the specifications with 
the dummies included (model 2). This may reflect collinearity between em- 
ployment  and  the  steel dummy, but  it also suggests that although  the steel 
industry has accounted for most of the withdrawals, the more general attribute 
that influences the withdrawal decision is an industry’s size. Also, in all spec- 
ifications the number of countries involved has a positive and significant influ- 
ence on the withdrawal decision, which suggests that the “multiple petition” 
strategy  can  significantly  increase  the  likelihood  the  industry  will  receive 
some type of  protection  (in the form of  some price/quantity  agreement).  I 
interpret this as implying that the tension created by a multiple petition filing 
pressures the countries  into arranging  a settlement.  Finally, in model 6 the 
economic criteria (which are known to the parties at the first stage) are tested 
for their influence on the withdrawal decision. The only significant variable is 
the  percentage  change in  capacity  utilization  during  the  year  immediately 
prior to the petition filing. The estimated coefficient implies that a fall in ca- 
pacity utilization increases the chances of the petition being withdrawn. The 
coefficient on this variable at the second stage, although insignificant, is also 
negative, providing only weak evidence that cases are withdrawn because of 
self-selection. ‘I 
The second  set of  regressions  (models  7-11)  concentrate  on the  second 
stage decision,  controlling  for the  first stage decision using  the number of 
countries dummy, employment, and percentage change in capacity utilization 
during the prior year. The analysis of the second-stage decision reveals that 
(1) the economic criteria do relatively poorly predicting the decision, (2) the 
Senate oversight effect is not significant, and (3) the ITA’s final duty margin 
is an important predictor of the injury decision. 
Consider first the set of economic criteria. In all the specifications the per- 
centage change in employment and capacity utilization perform poorly. Most 
of  the coefficients are insignificant. This is consistent with both the Hansen 
(1990) and Moore (1988) studies, suggesting that although the commissioners 
state that these economic criteria are important, it is difficult to measure their 
importance. In contrast, in all the specifications the final dumping margin has 
10.  I also tested for the significance of  the House oversight committee dummy. Results were 
virtually identical to  the Senate dummy and are available on request. 
11. I also ran other specifications to test for the importance of the other economic criteria (the 
level of capacity utilization and the concentration  ratio), but they were not significant. Results are 
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a positive and significant effect on the outcome. This is a bit surprising since 
the simple cross-tabulation results (table 2.7) suggested that there should be 
little effect. Note further that the final dumping margin is the one key variable 
not known during most of the investigatory period. In model 8 the number of 
countries involved in the filing is included in the specification.  It is negative 
but insignificant. A negative coefficient implies that, conditional on the case 
not being  withdrawn,  multiple  petitions decrease the  chance of protection. 
Model 9 estimates the steel industry’s  effect,  while model  10 estimates the 
Senate oversight effect; neither are significant.  In contrast with  the Hansen 
(1990) and Moore (1988) studies, I do not find that the Senate oversight com- 
mittee exerts influence on the ITC’s final decision. This result, along with the 
results of models 4  and 5, suggests that political pressure is most significant 
at the first stage. This is consistent with Baldwin’s (1985) conjecture that the 
ITC’s structure insulates it from political pressure. Finally, in model 11 I find 
that the levels of capacity utilization, employment, and concentration ratio do 
not affect the outcome. 
2.5  Concluding Comments and Interpretation of Results 
In this paper I have argued that the history of U.S.  antidumping usage re- 
quires  we  model  the  process  as a two-stage  problem.  Given that  approxi- 
mately 25 percent of petitions are withdrawn (usually with some type of pro- 
tection),  a  true  understanding  demands  that  we  analyze  the  first-stage 
withdrawal decision. Because protection granted via a price/quota agreement 
appears to be so desirable, we must analyze whether the failure to arrange an 
agreement is a signal of the eventual ITC decision. 
The key insight gained from the analysis in section 2.4 is that industry size 
and the number of petitions filed are the key determinants of  the first-stage 
decision. Although the simple cross-tabulations (section 2.3) suggested that 
economic criteria influence the withdrawal decision, I found very little econ- 
ometric evidence that the economic criteria influence the withdrawal decision. 
This suggests that the withdrawal decision is chiefly  influenced by political 
pressure.  Moreover,  (1) the steel industry dummy, (2) number of countries 
involved in the petition, and (3) industry employment are all significant deter- 
minants of the withdrawal decision but are not significant determinants of the 
injury decision. This, too, is consistent with the political pressure hypothesis 
but runs counter to the self-selection hypothesis. 
Furthermore, the analysis in  section 2.4 also suggests that the economic 
criteria are not significant predictors of the injury decision. Although this re- 
sult is a bit paradoxical,  especially in light of  the arguments and discussion 
found in the ITC’s case reports, it is consistent with both Moore’s (1988) and 
Hansen’s  (1990) findings, which  suggests that it is difficult to measure the 
economic criteria (if any) that are truly related to injury. As discussed earlier, 
there are most likely other variables such as import market share, exports, and 69  Selection of Antidumping Cases 
inventory that are used by the ITC in determining injury. The unavailability of 
these  variables  precluded  their  inclusion  in  the  analysis.  Future  analysis 
would surely benefit if these variables could be constructed. The unavailabil- 
ity of these variables also makes the results a bit more difficult to interpret. If 
these “missing” economic criteria are well proxied by the “known” economic 
criteria, then this result, that economic criteria have little predictive power, 
will not be altered by the inclusion of these additional economic variables. 
However, if the excluded variables are not related to the economic criteria 
already used, then this result may not be robust. 
The fact that I find no congressional oversight influence on the injury deci- 
sion is an important and interesting difference between this work and that of 
Moore (1988) and Hansen (1990). This is most likely due to the differences in 
the data sets-Moore’s  analysis includes only  a subset of  all antidumping 
cases while Hansen’s analysis combines countervailing duty and escape clause 
actions with antidumping cases-which  suggests that it is too early for any 
general insights about the influence of congressional oversight committees. 
If  cases  are  withdrawn  because  of  political  pressure  rather  than  self- 
selection, then the welfare implications of  such withdrawals are disturbing. 
Antidumping law was conceived as a protective measure to eliminate the po- 
tential threat of predatory pricing. However, it appears that industries of sub- 
stantial size can strategically manipulate the law (by filing multiple petitions) 
to gain protection when none may be warranted. The requirement that injury 
must be shown can be circumvented if the potential political fall-out is signif- 
icant. 
This analysis, along with the earlier findings of Messerlin (1988, 1989) and 
Prusa (1988), suggests that the filing of an antidumping petition may often be 
as strategically  motivated as it is economically motivated.  Hopefully  these 
findings will encourage others to further study the reasons for, and the effects 
of, such behavior. 
Data Appendix 
1. Basic case information such as the outcome,  date of  initiation,  subject, 
country, and the number (and type) of petitioners was found in the Fed-Track 
Guide to Antidumping Findings and Orders. Products are identified by their 
seven-digit TSUSA code. TSUSA codes can be found in the Federal Register 
notices that accompany each petition. The four-digit SIC code corresponding 
to the TSUSA code can be found in US.  Foreign Trade Statistics, Schedule 6. 
Gary Horlick also provided assistance in determining which withdrawn peti- 
tions involved officially sanctioned agreements. 
2. Capacity utilization  (practical rate) at the four-digit SIC level by  year 70  Thomas J. Prusa 
was  obtained from U.S. Bureau of  the Census Current Industrial Reports, 
Survey of  Plant Capacity. 
3.  Total employment at the four-digit SIC level by year was obtained from 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of  Manufactures, Subject Series. 
4. Four-firm concentration ratios at the four-digit SIC level was obtained 
from U. S. Bureau of the Census, Census of  Manufactures, Industry Series. 
5. Congressional influence was measured by  matching (four-digit SIC) in- 
dustry location with congressional districts. Typically, each product (identi- 
fied by  SIC code) is produced in a number of  regions in the country. If  a 
product is produced in a district whose congressional representative (House of 
Representatives or  Senate) is a member of  the Trade Subcommittee of  the 
House Ways and Means Committee or the International Trade Subcommittee 
of  the Senate Finance Committee, then I considered there to be a potential 
political pressure from that congressman. The Almanac of  American Politics 
was used to determine subcommittee membership. Data for industry location 
by district and year at the four-digit SIC level were obtained from the Census 
of  Manufactures, Geographic Area Series. An industry had to employ at least 
a thousand people in a district to be considered as potentially exerting political 
influence. 
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Comment  Robert M. Stem 
Let me begin by saying that I liked this paper very much. It is dealing with an 
especially important aspect of  U.S. trade policies. Prusa sets up his analysis 
clearly, organizes the data well, and interprets his empirical results in a sen- 
sible manner. 
Most of my remarks are designed to elaborate further some of the analytical 
and policy issues involved in antidumping (AD) actions, but I will also raise 
some questions about Prusa’s modeling decisions, selection of  variables, and 
interpretation of results. 
In order to set Prusa’s paper in context, it is worth noting that AD actions 
constitute by far the most intensively used of the available instruments of trade 
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policy that are designed ostensibly to deal with “unfair”  trade practices and 
import  disruption.  For example, according  to  Hoekman  and  Leidy,’ there 
were  1,277 AD investigations initiated and 541 AD actions actually carried 
out during the period 1980-85.  The chief countries/blocs involved were Aus- 
tralia (416; 138); Canada (230; 152), European Community (280; 122), Japan 
(1; 0) and the United States (350, 129). This compares to a total of 450 coun- 
tervailing duty (CVD) actions initiated and 110 actually implemented, 23 es- 
cape clause actions implemented, and 120 voluntary export restraints (VERs) 
implemented during this same period. 
These data provide some indication of the prevalence of AD actions in the 
major trading countries/blocs, and they also demonstrate as well the compar- 
atively small use that is made of escape clause actions. It thus seems reason- 
ably clear, as Hoekman and Leidy argue, that one can interpret the intensive 
use of AD actions as well as the related proliferation of VERs as an indication 
of  the  ineffectiveness  of  present  arrangements  governing  the  use  of  safe- 
guards. This further implies that the resort to AD actions may have less to do 
with  alleged dumping per  se and  more to do with market disruption  more 
generally due to increased imports. If AD actions are observed to have impor- 
tant detrimental effects on resource allocation and welfare, the question then 
becomes one of how to reduce reliance on these and other measures such as 
VERs.  This means finding ways to limit the resort to AD actions and/or to 
strengthen the use of safeguards agreements in the GATT. 
Turning now to Prusa’s analytical discussion, he notes that, for his purpose, 
it is adequate to use a simple definition of dumping, which is based on selling 
abroad at a lower price than at home. While this may be acceptable in a broad 
sense, there may in fact be important administrative differences involved in 
AD cases that are based on price differences as compared to those in which 
selling below cost may be the basis for an allegation of dumping. In particular, 
there  would  appear to be  much more administrative discretion involved  in 
selecting cost criteria and then calculating dumping margins based on these 
criteria. What I am wondering therefore is if it might be possible to distinguish. 
the AD actions initiated according to whether they are price or cost based, and 
if it makes a difference as to whether or not there will be a settlement. 
Prusa notes that there are numerous “frivolous”  AD actions initiated that 
are subsequently dismissed by the ITC. He chooses to exclude these actions 
from his analysis. There is a difficulty here, however, since the very existence 
of the AD legal mechanism and the filing of actions may affect the behavior 
of foreign and domestic firms in ways that correspond to the effects of  AD 
actions that  make  their  way  farther through  the  administrative process.  A 
more careful look at the characteristics of the so-called frivolous actions might 
therefore be worthwhile. 
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Prusa puts  forth two hypotheses-self-selection  and political pressure- 
relating to the withdrawal of AD actions. He notes that multiple filings of AD 
complaints against several countries may be indicative of the exercise of polit- 
ical pressure. But there is a related interpretation of multiple filings, which 
involves  the recognition  by  the  complainants that  it  is  in  their  interest  to 
broaden their complaints as much ‘as  possible since it is known that more se- 
lective AD actions will work less effectively. Thus, the more countries that 
can be targeted in an AD filing, the greater the likelihood of success that the 
complainants may achieve in protecting their economic interests. 
In  selecting the economic variables to be included in his analysis, Prusa 
identifies especially changes in  capacity utilization and changes in employ- 
ment as indicators that are apparently used by the ITC. What he does not make 
clear,  however, is whether these are the only important variables.  For ex- 
ample, does the ITC pay attention to such matters as changes in industry or 
firm profitability, changes in sales, and the degree of import penetration? Are 
the variables that Prusa has chosen really the important ones? If so, do they 
serve as adequate proxies for other excluded variables? If not, is he missing 
some important variables? This latter question is pertinent since his empirical 
results suggest that economic factors are not of great importance in explaining 
ITC decisions. 
In reporting his nested logit results for models 1-6  in Table 2.9, Prusa notes 
that the inclusion of the employment variable dominates the steel dummy. He 
then concludes that the results reflect industry size but not the special charac- 
teristics of the steel industry, which was a major AD complainant especially 
in 1982 and 1984. In view of the finding that the steel dummy is statistically 
significant by itself but not in combination with employment, isn’t this sug- 
gestive of multicollinearity? And, if so, is it correct to say that the results do 
not reflect the unusual importance of the steel industry, which also happens to 
be a rather large industry in terms of employment? 
The inclusion of the final dumping margin comes through as a statistically 
significant variable. Prusa does not have a ready answer as to why this is the 
case, since he mentions that the size of  this margin is not precisely known 
until the final decision has been made. But isn’t it possible that those involved 
have some notion of how large this margin might be in specific circumstances? 
The question, then, is that if the final dumping margin is found to be signifi- 
cant, is it acting as a proxy for some other determining variable? 
A further question that I have about the results concerns whether it is pos- 
sible to say anything about the goodness of fit of the nested logit model. In 
particular, can anything be said about how to interpret the residuals of  the 
estimating equations? Along the lines discussed above in choosing variables, 
are there some important omitted variables that should have been taken into 
account? 
It is interesting in conclusion to mention some implications of Prusa’s paper 
that might be worth pursuing in further research. As noted above, the use of 74  Thomas J. Prusa 
AD actions  is concentrated  especially  in  Australia,  Canada,  the  European 
Community,  and  the  United  States. It would  be  interesting in this  light  to 
consider whether Prusa could adapt his framework to investigate the determi- 
nants  of  AD complaints  and  actions in other political  environments  and to 
determine the  similarities and differences  as compared to U.S. experience. 
The same thing might apply in investigating the factors governing the use of 
AD and CVD actions and the relation of both types of actions to the introduc- 
tion of VERs. 
I interpret Prusa’s main finding to be that AD actions are dominated primar- 
ily by political rather than  strictly economic considerations.  The data cited 
earlier suggest that AD actions have become increasingly prevalent because of 
the ineffectiveness of safeguards procedures. The issue, then, is that AD ac- 
tions are being justified  on grounds of  alleged dumping,  whereas the more 
fundamental  problem  is  how  domestic  firms  should  respond  to  disruption 
from imports. In a setting in which there are structural changes in comparative 
advantage often combined with swings in real exchange rates, it is not surpris- 
ing that domestic  firms will find themselves under considerable pressure at 
given points in time. The challenge for policy thus ought to be the design and 
implementation of more effective safeguards measures and, at the same time, 
a movement to phase out AD measures or, as Hoekman and Leidy suggest,2 
to introduce more elements of safeguards into the AD measures. 
2. Ibid., 41-42. 